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. We are so accustomed to thinking of knowledge, and the gathering of
It, as unqualifiedly good, that even faithful Christians and Jews are prone
to forget that their scriptures depict the quest _for knowledge as a
so~ce of tragic separation from God. For Christians, the human
cho1ce for the unqualified pursuit of knowledge is what required
God's repair of creation through the saving power of Christ.
. The reminder of our tragic relation to the quest to know everything
IS graphically portrayed in the second and third chapters of Genesis.
Here is the account of the creation of . man and woman and of a
wonderful garden. Of its lovely fruit they may freely eat, but not of
~ne tree- the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. To eat of that
peeet m~s deat~. But Adam and Eve, beguiled by the charming sern ~ ' did eat of 1t and the results are with us still. Our earthly life is
.: a perfect paradise without pain and sweat. Above all, they and we
~ separated from the tree of life and are mortal, not able on our own
wer to live eternally.
a gBu~ is knowledge really to be regarded as forbidden fruit? How can
a good ~u~h as knowledge be so regarded? Is knowledge, often seen as
lesso;vil~n Itself, ever to be seen as evil in itself, and the desire for it, no

fru~a~ has

prompted me to dare consider any knowledge, that sacred

What~ scholars' treasured labors, as, in any sense, to be forbidden?

spendi~ol would ~ttack a growth industry like researc~?.Governme~t

19 40 , t~ for m~1~al research alone soared from 18 million dollars m

three bil/40 milhon. dollars in 1950, and from there to more than
strong ion dollars m 1979. The lure of forbidden fruit is rather
less, onast~ven Eden'~ owner and manager soon discovered. N everthee assumptiOn that David really beat Goliath, I will fashion
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even though we have seen what shocking expe.r iments were perpetrated
my small slingshot and aim it at that rich and industrious giar , know!·
by Nazi physicians, those atrocities were declared to be criminal under
edge.
the Nuremberg Code. And, even though Henry Beecher in 1966 found
Now do not misunderstand me. I have always been a con :ientious
22 American studies in violation of that code, the government has
member of the knowledge business. I work hard to justify 1y salary
by gathering and sharing knowledge. I have slept peacefully elieving responded by regulating the research it funds . 3 If someone would
assert, nevertheless, that gross violations will continue because people
that knowledge and the pursuit of it are good. But these fogmatic
slumbers have been disturbed by the roaring waves of res trch, bad will do whatever can be done, I had a standard reply: People do not
do whatever can be done. For example, research scientists do not chop
dreams, and nightmarish events.
First, Daniel Callahan, commenting· upon what he Cf ed "The up people systematically to discover what happens . That is what trig?ered the nightmare. Recently, it was revealed that the Japanese, durMoral Career of Genetic Engineering," noted that there ap ear to be
no "culturally persuasive" arguments against each next w e of gen· mg World War II, systematically removed the organs of prisoners to
lear~ exactly what occurs as this is done, and how vital each organ is
etic research being proposed. 1 On the one hand, there s genetic
to hfe. That ended my dogmatic slumbers. I am now well aware that
research of the very kind essential to creating the worlds dr: 1atized in
Orwell's 1984 and Huxley's Brave New World. Virtual! everyone there is a serpent in our midst, pushing research in genetics toward the
shrinks from these worlds. Yet, on the other hand, every 1 w genetic .realization of our worst fears, while beguiling us in the belief that the
research proposal promises beneficial results, ranging from .1e cure of need for knowledge is necessarily limitless and good , a veritable path
the same to Eden. And, at the same time, the most unthinkable brutalities have
cancer to increased food production beyond belief. And,
time, the genuine risks of entering the worlds depicted by )rwell and already been done in the context of research, placing us well outside
·
Huxley are discounted as obscurantist fear of the new. , 1d so, the of Eden. ·
pursuit of knowledge becomes a virtually uncontestable gc d . Indeed, kn I believe we are compelled by logical and practical necessity to limit
·know ledge and the gathering of it. The usual arguments for limiting
scientists argue for the freedom to do research unimpeded .
.owledge are that only bad results, bad usages, bad applications, and
e~I c?ncomita~ts of research, such as injury to humans, may block
'Haunting' Ideal Observer Theory
w at ls otherwise good to find out and to be in the business of finding
out · I. wan t .t o argue, to the contrary, that some knowledge and some
Aroused by this, only for a time, I fell asleep again. } J.t by now 1 ~ursutts of 1t are evil as such. For us, as humans there is evil knowlge and quests for knowledge that ought to be f~rbidden.
was vulnerable to a bad dream. The Ideal Observer Theor ; , a longtiJne
c
For my purpose, it is not important to argue for some definitive
source of comfort, began to haunt my sleep. 2 The Il 2al Observer
s:~~~ti?n
of knowledge, if such there even be. I will dwell on
Theory depicts knowledge as logically and practically 1ecessarY for
1 lc Instances of knowledge for the sake of each argument. In
discerning right and wrong. Furthermore, there is n o limit to t~~ general wh t '11
'
a WI count as knowledge are claims that are tested or
amount necessary . Nothing less than omniscience guara. Gees our ab
capae
bl fb ·
'
1 con
emg tested, by methods of observation, experiment, and
ity to discover moral truths. Should we not therefore, regard the ques
ceptual
anal
·
h.
.
. ys1s w 1ch people are persuaded will count for or
for knowledge not only as a good, but also as a sacred duty? ReallY· aga·
is
nm~tththe
drums
being put forth. Knowledge, on this understanding
though, how far do we think we can move down the road to om~:
et der total! Y certam
· nor totally complete. New claims and new'
llleth
cience? Only God can know everything. Note, however , t he pr~ble!ll;
not that we are limited to something short of omniscience. It_ IS ra~be the 0~ s ma~ or may not discredit past claims and past methods, and
that we set as our goal to become as much like God as possibl_e. the kno 1serva~10ns and concepts on which these are based. This view of
F"! edge mcludes religious knowledge.
tree of the knowledge of good and evil emerged in this dream with_nt
kno:!dt~en,
is ~nowledge ever evil in itself? In one sense, there is
disturbing thought that we, in ethics, are embarked on the anclelt
1 0
ethical
/
that
IS always good to have. For example, the more nonventure to become like God, knowing good and evil. Yet,. this d ~
ideal
b
acts
I
know,
the better I can decide what is right. Hence, an
trous activity comes clothed in an argument from necessity, agaJO
a
bett~r
:rver
?ad
best
be omniscient, and God, Who is omniscient, is
which an appeal to Eden's disaster appears hopelessly quixotic . ired
oral JUdge than I can ever be.
Even such bad dreams failed to arouse me. Finally, it requ uld
But what ab t th "
.
.
e knowledge" obtamed about non-ethical facts
nightmares . There are always those who have argued that you shO wl· through . . ou
not and cannot stop the curiosity which fuel s the gathering of knoaJI. Paradox ~ru~mal ~cts, such as murder, rape , or torture? Here the
eg~ns. GIVen the fact that crime in Boston was down in
edge . I have always regarded such arguments as disingenuous. After

°
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Spring 1983 and yet rape was up by more than 30 per cent, < :t udy of
ledge of
why these rapes occur might help us prevent them. The kn
rape events would seem to be beneficial. Nevertheless, the ra ·s which
yield such knowledge are terribly evil in themselves. In the ~ st of all
possible worlds, we would have no rapes to study. Some 1ings we .I
should never experience and yet these same experiences , ' ten they
occur should be well studied, and the results well knowr m d well 1
used to prevent the knowledge gained from the experienc< of rape.
The paradox here can only be resolved if we make use of a >t inction
once made by Bertrand Russell, namely the distinctiO! between
knowlege by description and knowledge by acquaintanc E Descrip·
tions of events, past, present and future, whether these 1ents are
good or evil, can be seen as always good, insofar as these c criptions
•s.
assist us in choosing what is right, and in increasing our ch
Lack of Knowledge Sometimes Good
Take the knowledge of what happened at Hiroshima. 1 this case
the tree of knowledge as descriptive knowledge can be u d to yield
the same fruit as the tree of life, for the sake of prevent iJ deaths, at
least in the context of earthly life. Yet, it is better still r 1er to find
sed. It ~
out precisely what happens when atomic weapons an
er
become
knowledge, like rape, with which one ideally should n
,
t
it
is like,
acquainted, just as Cain should never have found out w
1
and what occurs during and after one murders one's brot r.
'b
'
.
~ ~Interestingly enough, Gerhard Von Rad, when discus .ng e e
lical account (in Genesis, Chapters 2 and 3) of the tree • kn~~ledg.
of good and evil, distinguishes "intellectual knowing " f om ~xperf
0
iencing" or a "becoming acquainted with." 5 It is this l ,,ter kind
knowing, i.e ., "experiencing," which is the meaning of the Beb:~
word (yd) that describes the "knowledge" Adam and E\ would od
did obtain obtain from eating of the tree of the knowit·d ge _of go as
and evil. They experienced, became acquainted with evil ;w t s1m~ly aD
something to be described, but as something which hao pened m
activity they chose to do, and yet could have chosen n ot t o. do . d an
At this poi~t, we see the .di~ferenc~ between hum an ~emgs; that
omniscient bemg. An ommsc1ent bemg knows everythmg, a
me
.
.
includes any evil that has come a b out, 1s
commg
a bou t ' will co elY
about and might come about "if." All of this can be kn own p~rgle
,
.
.
.
ause a sin
descriptively without choosmg to sanctw~, engage m , or c
knoll'fl
evil event. Evil occasioned by human cho1ces can only become t one
descriptively to human beings, if and only if and when, at leas il ba5
person actively engages in perpetrating the evil. Only once the evt per·
been done or is being done, does knowledge describable by tha
son and others become available.
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The person who is responsible for some evil knowledge by acquaintance need not be the object of the descriptive knowledge generated.
The Japanese scientists who systematically removed organs from
World War II prisoners were doing what is forbidden, namely generating evil events, and making the observations and analyses that provided them and us with evil knowledge. Not only is what they did evil,
but it is also evil that anyone should experience, know by acquaintance, what these scientists were learnipg. Knowledge of what happened to those prisoners is, as knowledge by acquaintance, evil knowledge. However, given that the experiments have been done, descriptive
knowledge of them may be viewed as good to have, use, teach, and
analyze. That descriptive knowledge might hopefully help prevent any
future experiments like them. Also, there may indeed be medical benefits to learn. Even so, sheer curiosity about exactly what took place
need not be viewed as in the slightest evil in itself. But, the point is,
the experience of those events is an evil experience and choosing such
experiences should be regarded as seeking knowledge which is evil and
should be forbidden. Scientific knowledge of this kind is evil in the
same way and for the same reason that carnal knowledge which consti. ~utes rape is evil. No desire or alleged need for such know ledge makes
1t good.
Some knowledge is evil, but it is evil as knowl~dge by acquaintance,
not as knowledge described by someone who bears no responsibility
f~r initiating, observing, permitting, or otherwise making possible
firsthand acquaintance with such evil.
_T~e failure to recognize in what sense knowledge may in itself be
evil Is surely one very important reason for our inability to see that
~me knowledge should not be sought at all. Consider research using
umans and control groups whose members are unaware that they are
notre Ce1Vlng
· · either the standard treatment or the new treatment being
tes
st ted. When the question was raised at a conference as to when to
~ an experiment in which some of these untreated people were
~
ut to die, some American scientists contended that the experiment
8
ould not be stopped, even if some people died, until there were
~ugh cases to obtain statistically significant results. To do other! 'they argued, was to render the results of the experiment worthees:· If completed, the experiment would be good! I and others pres; SP<>ke against the sacrifice of innocent lives to achieve such a good.
w~ one _argued that the very knowledge of what happens when people
kn os~ hves could be saved are allowed to die is evil. In other words,
PreOWing~ what happens to someone while dying, whose dying I can
· Wo~~t, ls ~no~ing something that should be forbidden. The scientists
even be r!g~t m arguing that the results of a controlled experiment,
0
are . ne WhiCh causes preventable deaths, is valuable once the results
tau~~· and right . even in arguing that such results should be used,
'and not Withheld from any curious scrutiny. Descriptive, intelAllgust, 1985
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lectual knowledge of such an experiment may indeed be
~ wed as
good in itself even though the experiment is evil, and all 1 )Wledge
being experienced by those who can be held reponsible f
what is
happening is also evil.
I have argued so far that some knowledge is evil becaust> e experrything
ience of it is evil in itself and avoidable. At the same time,
that has already happened, good or evil, may be considere ;ood and
even necessary as knowledge for being as moral as it is po> 1le for us
generate
to be. Omniscience as an ideal state does not require one
dent, so
any evil. As Peter Martin, a Harvard Divinity School
astutely called to my attention, an omniscient being is no t ,rolved in
any process of gathering knowledge or choosing what t o J 1 out. All
of reality and all of what "might happen if" and "mig! 'lave hap·
pened if" is present to one who knows everything. A n .nniscient
being is different from an ordinary mortal in this ver mportant
respect, and there is no necessity for such a being to ger ate evil in
order to know everything. Humans ought not to knO\<\ verything,
because :some knowing is evil to choose as we have in· ated. Yet
such avoided evil is known, at least as a possibility by a Jmniscient
being. God, then, can be both good, and know all gooc' ·1d all evil.
Finite human beings, however, ought not to seek the evil ,rne by the
tree of the knowledge of all actual, and all possible, go od ·d evil.
So far, I have set no limit to the knowledge of any goo >r evil state
of affairs which already exists, provided that it is kno v . generated,
used, and taught in otherwise moral ways. However, t h· e is another
kind of limit to all knowledge, good knowledge as wel l We are not,
and cannot be, omniscient. This, I wish to argue, meam ot only that
we cannot realistically work to become omniscient, but ..ilso that we
ought not to do so. This may seem like a strange, even '·"'I·t e un neces·
sary point to make. I wish to show that it is ver y 1' ·cessary con·
sciously to opt against seeking omnis~ie.nce.
.
all
The fact is people do treat ommscience as an Idect. and actu Y
make use of what cannot ~e known. Thi~ t~kes place 1:1 at lea~t t~~
ways: in the use of certam consequentiahst form s o l reasonmg th
decide what is right or wrong; and in certain proposals settmg for
the ideal cognitive processes for deciding what is right or wrong.
To Operate or Not
.

.

. .

I was

First let us look at trymg to make god-hke m oral decisiOns: nd
'
. the followmg
. case. A woman, a d rug addict save
a
once presented
with
pusher, came to a hospital needing a heart operatio n urgen tlyi~~rablY
her life. The prospect ~as that ~he would. probably l1ve consne oper·
longer with the operation and die soon wit hout It . Should 0
hoW·
ate? I maintained one should. The doctor presen ting the case,
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ever, replied, "Wait a minute . The eminent ethicist, Joseph Fletcher,
counseled us not to treat this woman unless she agreed to stop taking
drugs and pushing them; think of all the young people this woman
may injure or even kill, " he argued. "When asked, she would not
agree, however, to give up drugs or give up pushing them . Now, would
you still recommend treatment?"
I then asked this physician whether drug addiction is a medical
problem. He replied that it is. Then I asked whether he , as a doctor, is
a minister of hope. He said he was. "Well then," I said, "treat this
woman to save her life and overcome her problems." As it turned out,
this woman was treated and her life saved. Furthermore, she gave up
her drug addiction and drug pushing, but she soon died. In fact , not a
single prediction used by Fletcher to counsel non-treatment was cor-

rect.

That Fletcher's predictions actually were incorrect is not my present
concern. My contention is rather that one cannot, and ought not,
~ake use of the predictions based on this woman's drug-related behavIor. It is simply true that no one can or should predict that she will
always use and sell drugs. There is no way of knowing this, and one
should not lock her into this as an inevitable, or even likely, permanent condition of her life. Indeed, one should work to change her life
for the better, and that requires her to be saved, as does also the sheer
value of her life as such.
.Joseph Fletcher is trying td inject into moral decision-making somethmg that does not at all belong there, namely predictions of individ~. behavior based on the probability that the individual will do what
18
hkely or typical of some aggregate pattern in which the individual
can, a~ least temporarily, be located. Even worse in this case, there was
no scientific basis for assuming that drug addicts and pushers, who
r~o!ess to find that what they do is desirable, are likely to continue
fe: activities. But decisions regarding the fate of individuals all too
0
Tn ta~e the form exhibited here by Fletcher.
ake JUdgments as to whether to use a scarce medical resource for
80
a ~eone 65 or someone 40. At the time a hospital in England posted
thstgn not to resuscitate anyone over 65, what to do was clear- rescue
doe person who is 40, forget the person who is 65. (The sign came
as wn,. by the way, after much publicity, and one doctor was quoted
thesa~mg that we should not have made the policy public by posting
hav stgn.) When it is argued, and it frequently is, that persons at 40
0
tha:'. n average, a higher remaining life expectancy than someone 65,
S(>ecif~1 ~rue. But it is not relevant for deciding whether to save a
. c Individual who is 65.
It 1S inte t·
of his l'f ~es mg to note that Winston Churchill was in the 65th year
1
benen de In 1939. Throughout World War II, Britain and its allies
that ~ ~ f fro~ the masterful leadership of someone over 65 who, if
ne Pohcy of that English hospital were to be followed, would
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not be a candidate for resuscitation had he needed it prior t o ;suming
this-worldly human effort, will necessarily benefit from the work of
his leadership role. Many people live much longer after 65 m some
others, and from their work over time.
people after 40 and they certainly may live very well. Am Wilder,
I leave for another essay and another occasion the fas cinating topic
professor emeritus at Harvard Divinity School, continues t publish,
of what processes are ideal for improving moral knowledge. Suffice it
though he has lived more than 80 years. At a recent gathe1 ~ honor
for now that I have suggested why some knowledge, some knowledge
ing him as a teacher, he remarked wryly, " If I had known 1 as going
gained by direct acquaintance, should be regarded as evil, and hence
to live so long, I would have taken better care of myself. " ' ~ know ·
evil to seek; and why some "knowledge," insofar as it is unattainable
ledge of how long and how well a specific individual will 1e is not
and requires omniscience, should be regarded as evil to use or strive to
ing such
available to us to use. Why some insist on claiming and
possess. I have convinced at least myself that there is a tree of the
"knowledge" is beyond me. But it is immoral.
knowledge of good and evil, and God has rightly ordained that we
Von Rad explicitly notes that the expression "knowin :ood and ' should not eat of it.
evil" as applied to the tree of knowledge, refers to kno 1g every·
thing.s Desiring the fruit of this tree, he claims, is a desir< )r omniscience, to be like God in this respect. Apparently , W f' ~e sorely
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